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Abstract This article assesses Charles Tilly’s Durable Inequality and traces its
influence. In writing Durable Inequality, Tilly sought to shift the research agenda of
stratification scholars. But the book’s initial impact was disappointing. In recent
years, however, its influence has grown, suggesting a more enduring legacy.
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It is an honor to be part of this volume and to appraise the influence of Charles
Tilly’s Durable Inequality. When I was just a doctoral student, attempting to
navigate the rough waters of a department whose approach to comparative historical
work ranged from the indifferent to the hostile, I went on a research trip to
“interview” the archives, seeking a way to formulate a dissertation project on
working class formation in nineteenth century America. Carol Connell, one of Tilly’s
students from his time at the University of Michigan, was then a junior professor at
Stanford and she encouraged me to start my trip with a visit to Tilly’s workshop at
the University of Michigan. When I got there, I found a better vision for how
academic work could be done, as well as both practical help and moral support from
Tilly. Then, after I began an assistant professor position at Berkeley, I went to spend
a semester’s leave at Tilly’s center at the New School, where I was able to participate
in the sort of workshop setting I had so admired in Ann Arbor. Those experiences
have profoundly shaped not only my work but also my teaching and mentorship. It
was a great gift and I’m happy to have the opportunity to credit Charles Tilly’s
influence and help.
In areas like the study of contentious politics, those of us influenced by Tilly’s
work have the advantage of being able to track the development of his thinking and
theorizing from structure to agency in his many books and articles. We can assess
Dynamics of Contention, for example, in light of not only his theoretical work on
collective action, From Mobilization to Revolution, but also his many empirical
studies of contention in France and Britain. However, in the case of Durable
Inequality (Tilly 1999), we do not have this large body of earlier work. Oh, we do
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some of the approach. But we have nothing like the early, careful, empirically rich
studies of collective action, where Tilly articulated alternative theoretical arguments
and provided the kind of persuasive evidence that led so many of us to believe that
he had better answers for how to understand contentious politics. Instead, Durable
Inequality is Tilly’s first major work on inequality and it draws very little on
empirical work that Tilly did before his turn to agency.
Durable Inequality opens with a critique of the vast majority of research on
stratification. It is an appreciative critique in that it notes that previous research has
clearly identified the empirical reality that analysts of inequality should be able to
explain (for example, by showing how much male female pay differences spring not
from unequal pay within the same jobs but from job segregation). However, it is also
a sharp critique for Tilly indicts stratification scholars for having done a poor job of
actually explaining the extensive inequality they document. They have done a poor
job, he suggests, because they have relied on an individualistic framework that
identifies in one way or another “powerful agents or institutions that sort individuals
whose attributes vary significantly into positions whose rewards differ greatly” (Tilly
2000b: 783–4). Such explanations are unsatisfactory he contends because categorical
differences in advantages among human beings are much larger than individual
differences in “attributes, preferences, or performances”. And they endure much
longer. So any satisfying explanation for inequality must begin by confronting the
fact that categorical differences in advantages swamp individual differences.
1
The bulk of Durable Inequality sketches a set of processes that Tilly suggests
underlie the many and varied forms of inequality that historians, sociologists and
anthropologists have uncovered and described. Two powerful processes are
fundamental in his view: exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Exploitation is the
process by which powerful connected people have control over resources and use
those resources to enlist others in production of value while excluding them from the
full value added by their efforts, using any of a number of means, such as legislation,
work rules, and outright repression. Opportunity hoarding occurs when members of a
categorically based network confine the use of the value-producing resource to others
in the in-group. Tilly is careful to note that elites engage in opportunity hoarding but
most of his examples are of non-elites who make peace—more or less—with a
categorical distinction and look for ways to advance within it rather than breaking
down the distinction. Behind his understanding of exploitation, as both Erik Olin
Wright (2000) and Michael Mann (1999) have argued, prowls Marx’s labor theory of
value. And his notion of opportunity hoarding owes much to Weber’si d e ao fs o c i a l
closure.
Two more processes help to cement inequality in Tilly’s model: emulation (in
which established organizational models are copied in new settings) and adaptation,
or the creation of everyday procedures and practices that people use to cope with and
1 In the interest of full disclosure, he makes this critique of my own work with my colleagues at Berkeley,
Inequality By Design (Fischer et al. 1996). It is appreciative in that he evaluates our effort as besting
Hernstein and Murray’si nThe Bell Curve, but sharp in that he argues that we fall into the trap of focusing
on individual difference. Moreover, he writes that to the extent we do offer an institutional account, it’s
untidy and does not clearly identify causal mechanisms.
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are echoes of the new institutionalism.
Tilly’s model rests on these four processes. The model is both relational and
interactional and it identifies organizations, broadly defined, as the key sites for the
creation and maintenance of durable categorical inequalities. Tilly insists that the
approaches of prior scholars who focus on human capital or on labor market
scarcities or on discrimination, are not wrong so much as simply drawing attention to
the by-product of the four processes he identifies.
With a dazzling array of examples and stunning erudition, Durable Inequality
attempts to flesh out this abstract model and to make it plausible enough to inspire
stratification scholars to shift their research program away from examining
individuals and social mobility to instead focus on studying different combinations
of mechanisms, settings and categories. Yet Durable Inequality did not have that
immediate effect.
The initial reaction to the book was respectful and there was widespread
agreement that it was an important theoretical contribution. But several objections
were also raised, one of which is especially relevant for thinking about Tilly’s role
and influence in the history of social science: what constitutes an explanation?
Michael Mann (1999) articulated a critique that I believe many others share:
mechanisms aren’t causality he implied, noting that although Tilly claimed to
explain inequality, his focus on mechanisms left the cause of inequality
unaddressed.
2 Mann wrote, “Since in [Tilly’s] theory causes must obviously concern
very long run processes whereby exploitation and hoarding are “installed”,w e
require historical analysis of their emergence.” He didn’t find an account that
explained why modern societies are dominated by the categories discussed in the
book (gender, racial, ethnic, occupational), and thus came away from the book
believing that it’s conceptual reach far exceeded Tilly’s grasp. Others complained
that it underplayed agency and focused too much on the role of organizations in
producing inequality (Laslett 2000; Morris 2000).
However, the most distressing critique for Tilly’s himself was almost certainly
t h a tt h eb o o kd i dn o th a v eab i gi m p a c to ns tratification scholars. Tilly tried in
different venues to engage his critics and to more clearly lay out the research
implications of his work—in Comparative Studies in Society and History (Tilly
2000a)a n da l s oi nContemporary Sociology (Tilly 2000b) —but to little immediate
effect. In 2001, he published one of the best pieces on Durable Inequality in the
journal, Anthropological Theory (Tilly 2001). He hoped, it seems to me, that
having had less success than he would have liked with sociologists, he might find a
more receptive audience with anthropologists.
I don’t know if that will prove to be the case or not, but I do know that the impact
in sociology has grown over time, and that recent work suggests that the influence of
Durable Inequality on stratification researchers is growing to be something closer to
what Tilly wished.
2 Tilly’s answer to Mann and to the others who make similar critiques of the relational realism of his late
work would no doubt have been, “how is why!” Tarrow (2008) documents this with respect to Tilly’s
work on contentious politics. See also Tilly and Goodin 2006
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along with Mark Stern and Jamie Fader analyzed a century of data on gender
inequality in the United States and, inspired by Tilly, asked directly about the
mechanisms that have reproduced it in modern U.S. history. They argue that durable
gender inequality across the 20th century was paradoxical rather than relentless, as
Tilly’s book suggests. By this they mean that Tilly’s model does not account for the
paradox of group mobility that coexists with structural inequality and ends up
reproducing it. They also suggest that a similar process of internal differentiation has
been characteristic of other categorically unequal groups in American history, most
notably African Americans and many ethnic minorities. Katz and his collaborators
thus assert that their work offers a crucial supplement to Durable Inequality.
Doug Massey’s Categorically Unequal (2007) builds even more ambitiously on
the edifice of Durable Inequality. It offers a systematic account of the American
stratification system in the twentieth century and relies heavily on the framework
elaborated in Durable Inequality to get at the mechanisms that have sustained racial,
gender, and class inequalities in the United States. But it also tackles the origins of
inequality in a most un-Tilly like fashion, drawing on social cognition studies and
neuroscience to argue that humans have a natural tendency to think in categorical
terms and, most controversially, that distinctions based on age, gender, race, and
ethnicity are more or less hard-wired. This is a step that Tilly steadfastly rejected
(2001: 363 1998: 64–5), and there are tensions in Massey’s analysis that follow from
his effort to marry Tilly’s relational analysis with a social psychology of
categorization. For example, some of the distinctions he sees as hard-wired, like
age, never became an organizing principle of durable inequality in the US, while
other distinctions that have no obvious basis in hardwiring, like class, do. Yet,
Massey’s use of Tilly ‘s central mechanisms (exploitation, opportunity hoarding,
emulation, adaption) to illuminate the varying institutional processes that make
different categorical inequalities more and less persistent over time does yield an
important empirical finding, to wit, that progress in breaking down one dimension of
categorical inequality often goes together with increased disadvantage for other
categorically unequal groups. Most significantly, Massey shows that the shrinking of
the class divide in the period form 1933 to 1974 went hand in hand with racial and
gender inequality while progress on the gender divide over the last 30 years has been
coupled with an increasing pervasiveness of class division. This finding, of course,
runs smack up against Katz et al’s suggestion that paradoxical inequality operates
similarly for women, African Americans, and most ethnic groups in the United
States, and also challenges Katz et al’s argument that when group mobility coexists
with structural inequality it can often end up reproducing the very categorical
inequality it seems to challenge.
Both Massey’s and Katz et al’s analysis of inequality rely on the kind of data that
has been central to the scholarly exploration of stratification for decades: individual
and occupational data from surveys or from the census. Such data is often the only
kind available, especially for historical studies. However, as Tomaskovic-Devey et
al. (2009) and Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-Devey (2010) have recently noted,
survey and census data on individuals is abstracted from its organizational context
and is thus problematic for investigating the interactional and relational contexts of
inequality that is fundamental to the theory advanced in Durable Inequality.
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the data we are able to gather on jobs within workplaces (i.e. within their
organizational context), the greater the inequality we are likely to detect. In two
recent articles that significantly advance Tilly’s relational model, Tomaskovic-Devey
et al. (2009) and Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-Devey (2010) use data collected on
organizations in the United States and Australia—including large and small for-
profit firms, non-profit workplaces, and government agencies—to investigate
inequality patterns in wages. Reasoning that wage distributions within firms result
from actors negotiating and contesting who should receive greater and lesser rewards
for their work, both articles examine whether earnings inequality is amplified when
categorical distinctions are mapped onto positional differences inside the organ-
izations. Looking specifically at wage disparity between two different groups:
mangers and core production workers on the one hand, and core workers and the
lowest paid workers on the other, they find that both in the U.S. and Australia,
inequality is greater when categorical differences like gender, education, race (in the
U.S.) and linguistic group (Australia) can be used by categorically advantaged
groups to extract greater rewards for the positions they hold in the organization.
They further find that while the generic processes in which actors attempt to exploit
and hoard opportunities from categorically distinct others in work organizations are
similar in the United States and Australia, status distinctions tend to produce larger
wage inequalities in the US, largely because of its extremely decentralized wage
bargaining system. They interpret the larger wage inequalities in the US as evidence
that Tilly’s generic relational model is enhanced when it is contextualized, as he
would no doubt have agreed.
These demonstrations of the explanatory power of Durable Inequality in the work
of Tomaskovic-Devey and his collaborators have appeared in key journals of
mainstream stratification research and can be expected to generate new analyses and
further questions. Thus, although Durable Inequality may have been less influential
initially than some of Tilly’s other works, that is clearly beginning to change.
Another important development is that scholars are beginning to connect Tilly’s
ideas about the processes that drive inequality with the kinds of contentious politics
that might potentially undermine them. For example, Gibson and Woolcock’s( 2008)
study of development projects in rural Indonesia borrows from Durable Inequality to
reconceptualize the meaning of “empowerment.” They argue that empowerment can
most usefully be thought of in terms of marginalized groups developing routines of
contestation that expose and weaken at least one of the four causal mechanisms that
drive durable inequality. They then use this reconceptualization to explain outcomes
of struggles over local power relations.
Inthisarticle,Ihaveconcentratedonscholarshipthatengagesdeeplywiththespecific
processes and mechanisms laid out in Durable Inequality. The book’s influence,
however, can also be seen in the increasing number of studies that find its title to be a
useful metaphor or that cite it when emphasizing the stubborn persistence of categorical
differences and the boundary maintenance such persistence entails (Sampson and
Morenoff 2006; Sampson and Sharkey 2008; Schneider 2008;L i g h t2009; Stainback
and Tomaskovic-Devey 2009). These, too, attest to an enduring legacy.
Let me conclude by relating something Tilly told me when I spent a leave at the
New School. I asked him how he was so productive. He told me that he
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He added that although that was key to his ability to publish so many books and
articles, he worried that it would mean that at the end of his life he would have never
gotten to his “A-list.” I like to think that his turn from structure to action in the 1990s
was not only a matter of stocktaking and reformulation after years of denial as other
contributions collected here so eloquently suggest, but also of finally allowing
himself to tackle his “A” priorities. After all, he wrote a phenomenal amount in the
1990s, like someone not only with a lot to say but also with the joy that must come
from finally letting yourself embark upon your top priorities if you have always put
them on hold in the past. The result was a huge treasure trove of ideas and research
questions. It’s gratifying to see that at least when it comes to his work on Durable
Inequality, others have finally taken up his ideas and are pursuing the kind of
research questions he urged us to ask. In short, I like to think that this recent work
using, extending, and challenging the theory in Durable Inequality is advancing one
of Tilly’s “A” priorities.
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